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Robert HOWSE* 
Reinhard Quick and I have something in common that relates to the just- 
mentioned episode around Asbestos: we both had our applications for leave to submit an 
amicus brief rejected and so I think it is kind of appropriate to focus on that. It reminds 
me of a song by one of my favourite singerlsong writers, Dar Williams, where she 
invents the category of “the most justified angry ex-girlfiiends”; our Panel today could 
be called the Panel of the most justified angry amicus rejectees. 
What is an amicus brief and what is its role in litigation, municipal and international? 
Very quickly, it is essentially a written submission by a party to a proceeding in which 
that party either addresses issues of fact and/or, more especially, issues of law involved 
in the case. The kind of procedure pre-supposes that some entity or person or even 
government, let us say a non-party to litigation, can have something useful to say to the 
adjudicatoFand we can explore some of the reasons for that-but I would like to focus 
on one particular feature of the role of hspute settlement in the World Trade 
Organization. 
As you know, there is only contentious jurisdiction in WTO cases. No one can refer 
an abstract issue of law to a WTO panel or, as may be more appropriate, to the Appellate 
Body. Nevertheless, even though all the proceedlngs are in some sense inter-party, the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding @su) gives the dispute settlement organs not only 
the role of finding a satisfactory resolution of the individual dispute between the parties 
but also the role of “clarifymg” the law. And as all of us know, parties, when they make 
submissions in a contentious proceeding, advance legal arguments, and advance 
interpretations of the facts that have a lot to do with litigation strategy. These choices 
can relate to politics, and they relate to positions that they are talung in other matters, 
whether those are other legal proceedings or political disputes. And so it may well be 
that the kinds of arguments that parties to a proceeding may make and the kinds of facts 
they may be willing to put into play may not necessarily be of an adequate or sufficient 
nature to provide an objective determination and resolution of the matter. 
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And so in these circumstances, where there is a role of clarifying the law and where 
in the case of panels there is a duty to make an objective assessment, an objective 
determination, i.e. not simply to produce a settlement acceptable to the parties, one can 
well see that an outsider with a different interest or maybe not the same constraints on 
the hnds of legal arguments and facts that they might bring to the attention of the 
adjudxator, might have a good and important role to play. 
Well, very briefly in two minutes, there is a legal basis for both panels and the 
Appellate Body to have the discretion to accept amicus briefs. In light of much of the 
heated dxussion of this issue it has to be stressed, as the Appellate Body itself has 
emphasized on two occasions, that we are not talking about the rights non- 
governmental actors and non-WTO Members to have such submissions considered. The 
legal issue in the first instance before the WTO and before the Appellate Body is whether 
panels or the Appellate Body have the discretion to accept such briefs, and that is a very 
different issue. You can have the discretion, but that does not mean that anyone has the 
right to submit because States have rights under the WTO system. It would really be 
quite a radlcal departure to suggest that any non-State appellant would have a right to 
intervene in the proceedmgs and I think a lot of the people who have gone ballistic over 
the idea that amicus briefs should be accepted have done so just based upon this 
misunderstanding. We are not talking about the right to anyone to have their brief 
considered, we are only talking about a discretion of the adjudicator to take it into 
account if it is appropriate. 
The first proceedmg where there was an Appellate Body d n g  on t h s  issue, the 
Shrimp/Turtle case,’ the Panel below had come to the conclusion that it did not have 
the discretion to take into account a brief on the basis of a perverse readmg of Article 
13 of the DSU and the Panel suggested something along the following lines: Article 13 
gives us a right to seek information from non-governmental appellants, ergo if we are not 
seeking the information we don’t have a right to receive it. We don’t have a right to 
get it. 
Well, imagine the following: an immigration statute that gves a person with a 
certain visa a right to seek employment in the United States. And supposing that they 
can get an unsolicited job offer, should a reasonable interpretation of that statute be that 
because somebody phoned you up and offered you the job and you are not seeking it, 
you can’t take it? It is simply a non-sequitur to suggest that a right to seek information 
implies a prohibition on taking information that isn’t solicited. That is an absurd 
interpretation and the Appellate Body threw it out quite rightly and said that here, in 
the role of making an objective assessment? an objective determination of the matter 
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there is considerable authority to investigate the law and the facts, and it is on that basis 
that one can understand this discretion. 
In the Carbon Steel3 case, the law was clarified with respect to submissions of amicus 
briefs to the Appellate Body itself, and I think the Appellate Body quite rightly said that 
if we have the right to create our own procedures we certainly have the right to a 
procedural discretion, includmg a discretion to receive the brief. 
Some people suggested that if you rely for your discretion on provisions that say 
that you have a right to create certain working procedures for yourself, that the only 
way you can exercise your discretion is through going out and creating those working 
procedures. But that is just as much a logical non sequifur as the one about seeking 
information. You may well invoke a clause that gives you the right to create your own 
procedures as evidence of the amplitude of your procedural discretion, but that does not 
mean that whenever you exercise discretion, the only way you can is through the 
creation of new working procedures. 
It is true that the DSU does not confer any explicit power on the Appellate Body 
to accept aminrs briefs- But as just noted, it had considerable procedural discretion. And 
if you read the DSU carefully you will find that it doesn’t explicitly confer on the 
Appellate Body the power to accept oral and written submissions from the parties (even 
though, curiously, thrd parties are mentioned). So if we don’t read some implicit 
powers or authorities into the mandate of the Appellate Body, appellate review won’t 
make sense at all. As already noted, the dspute settlement system exists in part in order 
to clarify the existing law-the DSU says that. And it is a well-established doctrine of 
international law that an international body should have implied to it, those powers that 
are necessary and incidental to the exercise of its fimctions or responsibilities.4 
Anyhow, finally to the Asbestos episode very briefly.In t h s  case the Appellate Body 
developed a special procedure dealing with a submission of briefs where you had to file 
an application for leave, and in your packet you will find a copy of this special procedure 
and you will also find a copy of my application for leave to file a brief.5 I was rejected 
by the Appellate Body on the basis that I did not fulfil the requirements that are listed 
in paragraph 3 which lists various things that you have to include in your application in 
order to have a chance of success. 
Now as a professor, when I was rejected, I said to myself: “I have got to get out of 
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WTO law because how can I possibly face my students as an authority in this area if I 
cannot follow a simple set of requirements and I get my application thrown out because 
I failed to follow the requirements?” So I have a task for you, and I wdl give you all my 
e-mail address. You go through all these paragraph 3 requirements and tell me which of 
them I did not fulfil. You have my application and you have the requirements. (As for 
the students, they couldn’t find any instance where I did not meet the paragraph 3 
requirements. So after that I did feel better about being a WTO scholar.) 
Now I should only say one thing in closing: don’t tell me it is because it is longer 
than three pages. The limit for an application was three pages. When it was reproduced 
for this Conference it was reproduced in a larger font than I actually used but when it 
was sent to the Appellate Body it was sent in three pages. Among the defects of this 
special procedure is that it did not specify anything about a font, or indeed as one 
practitioner pointed out to me, about page size either. It also does not tell you whom 
you must serve this application on or through what means. And there is another 
fundamental problem with the procedure that I just want to sustain in closing; you can 
refer to 3(0, it says that in your application you have to address only those arguments 
that are stated in Canada’s notification of appeal. You are limited to those arguments, 
and the problem in this case is that one of the most fundamental issues, the interpretation 
of At-hcle 111 of the GATT, is an issue that would only be put in play later by the cross- 
appeal of the European Community. In my own application I tried to address this 
difficulty by linking the Article III issue to other interpretations by the Panel that were 
the subject of Canada’s Appeal, and dealing with Article 111 indirectly through taking 
issue with those other interpretations. 
In any case, there was no way of using this mechanism to address any counterclaims 
or counter-appeal of the appellee and surely that is less than due process, when you are 
entertaining amicus submissions that address the appellant’s claims, but not those of the 
cross-appelladappellee. 
